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Abstract
The probability theory is a well-studied branch of
mathematics, in order to carry out formal reasoning
about probability. Thus, it is important to have a logic,
both for computation of probabilities and for reasoning
about probabilities, with a well-defined syntax and se-
mantics. Both current approaches, based on Nilsson’s
probability structures/logics, and on linear inequalities
in order to reason about probabilities, have some weak
points.
In this paper we have presented the complete revision
of both approaches. We have shown that the full em-
bedding of Nilsson’ probabilistic structure into proposi-
tional logic results in a truth-functional many-valued
logic, differently from Nilsson’s intuition and current
considerations about propositional probabilistic logic.
Than we have shown that the logic for reasoning about
probabilities can be naturally embedded into a 2-valued
intensional FOL with intensional abstraction, by avoid-
ing current ad-hoc system composed of two different
2-valued logics: one for the classical propositional logic
at lower-level, and a new one at higher-level for prob-
abilistic constraints with probabilistic variables. The
obtained theoretical results are applied to Probabilistic
Logic Programming.
1 Introduction
The main motivation for an introduction of the in-
tensionality in the probabilistic-theory of the proposi-
tional logic is based on the desire to have the full logical
embedding of the probability into the First-Order Logic
(FOL), with a clear difference from the classic concept
of truth of the logic formulae and the concept of their
probabilities. In this way we are able to replace the ad-
hoc syntax and semantics, used in current practice for
Probabilistic Logic Programs [1, 2, 3, 4] and probabilis-
tic deduction [5], by the standard syntax and seman-
tics used for the FOL where the probabilistic-theory
properties are expressed simply by the particular con-
straints on their interpretations and models.
In this paper we will consider the probabilistic seman-
tics for the propositional logic (it can be easily ex-
tended to predicate logics as well) [6, 7] with a fixed
finite set Φ = {p1, ..., pn} of primitive propositions,
which can be thought of as corresponding to basic prob-
abilistic events. The set  L(Φ) of the propositional for-
mulae is the closure of Φ under the Boolean operations
for conjunction and negation, ∧ and ¬, that is, it is the
set of all formulae of the propositional logic (Φ, {∧,¬}).
In order to give the probabilistic semantics to such for-
mulae, we first need to review briefly the probability
theory (see, for example, [8, 9]):
Definition 1 A probability space (S,X , µ) consists of
a set S, called the sample space, a σ-algebra X of sub-
sets of S (i.e., a set of subsets of S containing S and
closed under complementation and countable union, but
not necessarily consisting of all subsets of S) whose
elements are called measurable sets, and a probability
measure µ : X → [0, 1] where [0, 1] is the closed interval
of reals from 0 to 1. This mapping satisfies Kolmogorov
axioms [10]:
A.1 µ ≥ 0 for all X ∈ X .
A.2 µ(S) = 1.
A.3 µ(
⋃
i≥1Xi) =
∑
i≥1 µ(Xi), if Xi’s are
nonempty pairwise disjoint members of X .
The µ({s}) is the value of probability in a single point
of space s.
The property A.3 is called countable additivity for the
probabilities in a space S. In the case when X is finite
set, then we can simplify property A.3 above to
A.3’ µ(X
⋃
Y ) = µ(X) + µ(Y ),
if X and Y are disjoint members of X , or, equivalently,
to the following axiom:
A.3” µ(X) = µ(X
⋂
Y ) + µ(X
⋂
Y ),
where Y ) is the compliment of Y in S, so that µ(X) =
1− µ(X).
In what follows we will consider only finite sample
space S, so that X = P(S) is the set of all sub-
sets of S. Thus, in our case of a finite set S we
obtain, form A.1 and A.2, that for any X ∈ P(S),
µ(X) =
∑
s∈X µ({s}).
Based on the work of Nilsson in [6] we can define for
a given propositional logic with a finite set of prim-
itive proposition Φ the sample space S = 2Φ, where
2 = {0, 1} ⊂ [0, 1], so that the probability space is
equal to the Nilsson structure N = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ).
In his work (page 2, line 4-6 in [6]) Nilsson consid-
ered a Probabilistic Logic ”in which the truth values
of sentences can range between 0 and 1. The truth
value of a sentence in probabilistic logic is taken to be
the probability of that sentence in ordinary first-order
logic.” That is, he considered this logic as a kind of
a many-valued, but not a compositional truth-valued,
logic. But in his paper he did not defined the formal
syntax and semantics for such a probabilistic logic, but
only the matrix equations where the probability of a
sentence φ ∈  L(Φ) is the sum of the probabilities of
the sets of possible worlds (equal to the set S = 2Φ) in
which that sentence is true. So that he assigns two dif-
ferent logic values to each sentence φ: one is its proba-
bility value and another is a classic 2-valued truth value
in a given possible world. It is formally contradictory
with his intension paraphrased above. In fact, as we
will see in one of the following Section, the correct for-
malization of such a many-valued logic with probabilis-
tic semantics is different, and more complex, from his
intuitive initial idea.
The logic inadequacy of this seminal work [6] of Nill-
son is also considered in [11], by extending this Nils-
son structure N = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ) into a more general
probability structure M = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ, π), where π
associates with each s ∈ S = 2Φ the truth assign-
ment π(s) : Φ → 2 in the way that we say that
p ∈ Φ is true at s if π(s)(p) = 1; false at s other-
wise. This mapping π(s) can be uniquely extended to
the truth assignment on all formulae in  L(Φ), by tak-
ing the usual rules of propositional logic (the unique
homomorphic extension to all formulae), and we can
associate to each propositional formula φ ∈  L(Φ) the
set φM consisting of all states s ∈ S where φ is true
(so that φM = {s ∈ S | π(s)(φ) = 1}). In [11] it was
demonstrated that for each Nilsson structure N there
is an equivalent measurable probability structure M ,
and vice versa.
But, differently from Nilsson, they did not define a
many-valued propositional logic, but a kind of 2-valued
logic based on probabilistic constraints. They denoted
by wN (φ) the weight or probability of φ in Nilsson struc-
ture N , correspondent to the value µ(φM ), so that the
basic probabilistic 2-valued constraint can be defined
by expressions c1 ≤ wN (φ) and wN (φ) ≤ c2 for given
constants c1, c2 ∈ [0, 1]. They expected their logic to
be used for reasoning about probabilities.
But, again, from the logic point of view, they did not
defined a unique logic, but two different logics: one for
the classical propositional logic  L(φ), and a new one
for 2-valued probabilistic constraints obtained from the
basic probabilistic formulae above and Boolean oper-
ators ∧ and ¬. They did not consider the introduced
symbol wN as a formal functional symbol for a mapping
wN :  L(Φ)→ [0, 1], such that for any propositional for-
mula φ ∈  L(Φ), wN (φ) = µ({s ∈ S | π(s)(φ) = 1}).
Instead of this intuitive meaning for wN they consid-
ered each expression wN (φ) as a particular probabilis-
tic term (more precisely, as a structured probabilistic
variable over the domain of values in [0, 1]).
It seams that such a dichotomy and difficulty to have a
unique 2-valued probabilistic logic, both for an original
propositional formulae in  L(Φ) and for the probabilistic
constraints, is based on the fact that if we consider wN
as a function with one argument then it has to be for-
mally represented as a binary predicate wN (φ, a) (for
the graph of this function) where the first argument
is a formula and the second is its resulting probability
value. Consequently, a constraint ”the probability of
φ is less or equal to c”, has to be formally expressed
by the logic formula wN (φ, a)∧ ≤ (a, c) (here we use
a symbol ≤ as a built-in rigid binary predicate where
≤ (a, c) is equivalent to a ≤ c), which is a second-order
syntax because φ is a logic formula in such a unified
logic language. That is, the problem of obtaining the
unique logical framework for probabilistic logic comes
out with the necessity of a reification feature of this
logic language, analogously to the case of the inten-
sional semantics for RDF data structures [12].
Consequently, we need a logic which is able to deal di-
rectly with reification of logic formulae, and this is the
starting point of this work. In fact as we will see, such
an unified logical framework for the probabilistic the-
ory can be done by a kind of predicate intensional logics
with intensional abstracts, that transforms a propo-
sitional formulae φ ∈  L(Φ) into an abstracted term,
denoted by ⋖φ⋗. By this approach the expression
wN (⋖φ⋗, a)∧ ≤ (a, c) remains to be an ordinary first-
order formula. In fact, if ⋖φ⋗ is translated into non-
sentence ”that φ”, then the first-order formula above
corresponds to the sentence ”the probability that φ is
true is less than or equal to c”.
More about the intensional FOL can be found in the
Appendix. The decision to define the intensional FOL
with abstraction in Appendix, instead in the first Sec-
tion is based only on the fact that main issue of this pa-
per is the probabilistic logic and not intensional logic.
But for readers without previous experience about the
intensional FOL, we recommend to read this Appendix
before the Section 3. Also the particular development
of this intensional FOL is an original contribution of
this paper. The Plan of this work is the following:
In Section 2 we investigate the relationship between
Nilsson’s probability structure and many-valued propo-
sitional logic. We define an algebraic probabilistic
propositional logic for Nilsson’s structure and show
that it is correct truth-functional many-valued logic
for computation of probabilities analogously to Nils-
son’s structure.
In Section 3 we define an embedding of the probability
theory, both with reasoning about probabilities, into an
intensional FOL with intensional abstraction. Then we
show that the probabilities of propositional formulae
corresponds to the computation of their probabilities
in Nilsson’s structures, that is, this intensional FOL is
sound and complete w.r.t the measurable probability
structures.
Finally, in Section 4 we apply the theoretical results,
obtained in previous two Sections, to Probabilistic
Logic Programming.
2 Probabilistic logic and many-
valuedness
The work of Jan Lukasiewicz was without doubt
the most influential in the development of many-valued
modal logics [13, 14, 15, 16]. In Lukasiewicz’s concep-
tion, the real definition of a logic must be semantic and
truth-functional (the logic connectives are to be truth
functions operating on these logical values): ”logic is
the science of objects of a specific kind, namely a sci-
ence of logical values”. Many-valued logics are non-
classical logics. They are similar to classical logic be-
cause they accept the principle of truth-functionality,
namely, that the truth of a compound sentence is deter-
mined by the truth values of its component sentences
(and so remains unaffected when one of its component
sentences is replaced by another sentence with the same
truth value). But they differ from classical logic by the
fundamental fact that they do not restrict the number
of truth values to only two: they allow for a larger set
of truth degrees.
The Lukasiewicz’s work promoted the concept of logic
matrix, central concept for the construction of many-
valued logics, implicit in the works of C.S.Pierce and
E.Post as well. We will briefly present the previous
work for many-valued propositional logics, based on
such matrices: The representation theorems [17] for
such logics are based on Lindenbaum algebra of a logic
 L = (Φ,Ø,), where Φ is a set of propositional vari-
ables of a language  L, Ø is the set of logical connectives
and  is the entailment relation of this logic.
We denote by  L(Φ) the set of all formulae. Linden-
baum algebra of  L is the quotient algebra  L(Φ)/ ≡,
where for any two formulae φ, ψ ∈  L(Φ), holds the
quivalence φ ≡ ψ iff φ  ψ and ψ  φ . The stan-
dard approach to matrices uses a subset D ⊂ A of the
set of truth values A (nullary operators, i.e., logic con-
stants), denominated designated elements; informally
a designated element represent an equivalence class of
the theorems in  L. Given an algebra A = (A, {o}o∈Ø),
the Ø-matrix is the pair (A, D), where D ⊂ A is a
subset of designated elements. The algebraic satisfac-
tion relation |=a (’a’ stands for ’algebraic’) is defined
as follows:
Definition 2 Let  L = (Φ,Ø,) be a logic, (A, D) a
Ø-matrix, and φ ∈  L(Φ). Let v : Φ→ A be a mapping
that assigns the logic values to propositional variables,
and v :  L(Φ)→ A be its unique extension to all formu-
lae of this logic language  L(Φ). We define the relation
|=a inductively as follows:
1. (A, D) |=av φ iff v(φ) ∈ D,
2. (A, D) |=a φ iff v(φ) ∈ D for every v : Φ→ A.
We say that a valuation v is a model for a subset of
propositional formulae Γ ⊂  L(Φ) if for all formulae
φ ∈ Γ it holds that (A, D) |=av φ.
Any modal 2-valued logic can be considered as many-
valued truth-functional logic for a given set W of
possible worlds as well, given by a complex algebra
A = (A, {
⋂
,
⋃
, /,m, l}) of ”truth-values”, where A =
P(W) is the powerset of complete lattice of ”truth-
values” (empty set ∅ is the bottom, while W is the
top ”truth-value”) and
⋂
,
⋃
, / are algebraic opera-
tions for conjunction, disjunction and negation (that
is, the set-intersection, set-union and set-complement
operators) respectively, while m, l are algebraic oper-
ations for universal and existential modal logic oper-
ators: in this approach the ”truth-value” of a given
sentence φ is equal to the subset of possible worlds
‖φ‖ where this formula φ is satisfied, i.e., equal to
{w ∈ W | M |=w φ} ∈ P(W). In such an alge-
braic logic of a modal logic, the Ø-matrix is a pair
(A, D) where the set of designated values is a single-
ton D = {W}. Thus, a sentence φ is ”true in a Kripke
model M = (W ,F , v)” with a frame F of this modal
logic iff (A, D) |=av φ , that is, iff v(φ) ∈ D (i.e., iff
v(φ) =W), that is, if the ”truth-value” of φ is the top
value in A = P(W). Notice that instead of this set-
based algebra A = (A, {
⋂
,
⋃
, /,m, l}) we can use the
functional algebra A = (A˜, {
⋂˜
,
⋃˜
, /˜, m˜, l˜}) with higher
order ”truth values” [18, 19] given by functions in the
functional space A˜ = 2W , where for each S ∈ P(W) we
have the correspondent functional truth-value f ∈ 2W ,
such that for any w ∈ W it holds that f(w) = 1 iff
w ∈ S. For example, the function f
⋂˜
g : W → 2 is
defined for any s ∈ W by (f
⋂˜
g)(s) = f(s) · g(s), while
(f
⋃˜
g)(s) = f(s) + g(s) and (/˜(f))(s) = 1− f(s).
In what follows, for any function f ∈ 2S we denote
its image by Im(f) = {s ∈ S | f(s) = 1}, so that
Im(f
⋂˜
g) = Im(f)
⋂
Im(g) and im(/˜(f)) = S/Im(f).
Here we consider the possibility to have also infinite
matrices for many-valued truth-functional logics, dif-
ferently from other approaches that consider only finite
matrices [20]. In fact, based on Nilsson probabilistic
structure N = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ), we can define the fol-
lowing Probabilistic algebra:
Definition 3 Let N = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ) be a Nilsson
structure with a sample space S = 2Φ. Then we define
the probabilistic algebra A = (2S × [0, 1], {uprise,∼}) with
the Ø-matrix (A, D) where D = {(f, µ(im(f))) | f ∈
2
S} is a set of designated elements, such that the
binary operator ”p-conjunction” uprise and unary opera-
tor ”p-negation” are defined as follows: for any two
(f, x), (g, y) ∈ A = 2S × [0, 1],
uprise((f, x), (g, y)) = (f
⋂˜
g, µ(Im(f
⋂˜
g)))
if x = µ(im(f)), y = µ(im(f));
(f
⋂˜
g, 0) otherwise,
∼ (f, x) = (/˜(f), µ(/˜(f)) if x = µ(im(f));
(/˜(f), 0) otherwise.
Notice that each truth-value of this algebra is a pair
of elements a ∈ A: first one π1(a) defines the set of
possible worlds in S where a propositional formula in
 L(Φ) is satisfied, while the second element π2(a) is the
probability of this formula (here πi, i = 1, 2 are first
and second cartesian projections).
The set of truth-values in A is infinite, but its subset of
designated elements is finite for the finite set of propo-
sitional variables in Φ.
Let us show that this algebra represents a truth-
functional many-valued semantics for the propositional
Nilsson’s probabilistic logic.
Proposition 1 Let N = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ) be a Nils-
son structure with a sample space S = 2Φ, with the
Ø-matrix (A, D) given by Definition 3, and where
v : Φ → A is a mapping that assigns the logic val-
ues to propositional variables, such that for any p ∈ Φ,
v(p) = (f, µ(Im(f))) where for any s ∈ S = 2Φ it holds
that f(s) = s(p). We denote by v : (Φ, {∧,¬}) → A
the unique homomorphic extension of v to all formulae
of the propositional logic (Φ, {∧,¬}).
Then, for any propositional formula φ ∈  L(Φ) we have
that (A, D) |=av φ implies that π2(v(φ)) is the Nils-
son’s probability of φ.
That is, a many-valued truth-functional assignment v
is a model for this propositional probabilistic logic.
Proof: Let us demonstrate this proposition by struc-
tural induction on formulae φ ∈  L(Φ):
1. For any basic propositional formula p ∈ Φ we
have that (A, D) |=av p (it holds that v(p) =
(f, µ(Im(f))) ∈ D).
Let us suppose that φ1, φ2 ∈  L(Φ) satisfy this prop-
erty, that is, v(φ1) = (f, µ(Im(f))) ∈ D and v(φ2) =
(g, µ(Im(g))) ∈ D. Then we have the following two
cases:
2.1 Case when φ = φ1 ∧φ2. Then v(φ) = v(φ1 ∧φ2) =
= uprise(v(φ1), v(φ2)) (from the homomorphic property)
= uprise((f, µ(Im(f))), (g, µ(Im(g))))
= (f
⋂˜
g, µ(Im(f)
⋂
Im(g))) (from Definition 3)
= (f
⋂˜
g, µ(Im(f
⋂˜
g))) ∈ D (from f
⋂˜
g ∈ 2S).
2.2 Case when φ = ¬φ1. Then v(φ) = v(¬φ1) =
= ∼ (v(φ1)) (from homomorphic property)
= ∼ (f, µ(Im(f)))
= (/˜(f), µ(S/Im(f)) (from Definition 3)
= (/˜(f), µ(Im(/˜(f))) ∈ D (from /˜(f) ∈ 2S).
Thus, for any φ ∈  L(Φ) we have that v(φ) =
(f, µ(Im(f)), where f : S → 2 satisfies for any
s ∈ S = 2Φ that f(s) = 1 if s(φ) = 1, so that
µ(Im(f)) = π2(v(φ)) is the Nilsson’s probability of the
formula φ.
From the fact that for any φ ∈  L(Φ) holds that
(A, D) |=av φ we deduce that v is a model for this
propositional probabilistic logic.

Notice that for a given propositional logic (Φ, {∧,¬})
and Nilsson’s structure N = (2Φ,P(2Φ), µ), a model
v : (Φ, {∧,¬}) → A computes the probabilities of all
formulae in  L(Φ). But there is no way for this many-
valued propositional logic (Φ, {∧,¬}) to reason about
these probabilities.
Notice that this approach to probabilistic many-valued
logic demonstrate that, differently from Nilsson’s re-
mark (l.3-5, p.72 in [6]):
• ”..we present a semantic generalization of ordinary
first-order logic in which the truth values of sen-
tences can range between 0 and 1. The truth-value
of a sentence in probabilistic logic is taken to be the
probability of that sentence ..”
the truth-value of a sentence is not the probability of
that sentence but the pair (f, a) where the first element
f ∈ 2S is a mapping from the sample space S = 2Φ
into the set 2; only its second component a ∈ [0, 1] is
the probability of that sentence. It demonstrates that
his intuition was only god but approximative one, so
that we needed this complete and formal revision of his
original intuition.
The second consequence is that, differently from cur-
rent opinion in the computer science community that
the probabilistic logic is not truth-functionally many-
valued logic, we demonstrated that indeed it is : the
truth-value of a complex sentence is functionally de-
pendent on the truth-values of its proper subsentences,
as in standard many-valued logics.
3 Probabilistic logic and intensionality
In order to reason about probabilities of the propo-
sitional formulae we need a kind of 2-valued meta-logic
with reification features, thus, a kind of intensional
FOL with intensional abstraction presented in the Ap-
pendix.
Intensional entities are such things as concepts, propo-
sitions and properties. The intensional abstracts are
’that’-clauses. For example, in the intensional sentence
”it is necessary that φ”, where φ is a proposition, the
’that φ’ is denoted by the ⋖φ⋗, where ⋖⋗ is the in-
tensional abstraction operator which transforms a logic
formula into a term. So that the sentence ”the prob-
ability that A is less then or equal to c” is expressed
by the first-order logic formula wN (⋖φ⋗, a)∧ ≤ (a, c),
where ≤ is the binary built-in predicate ’is less then or
equal’, where the usual notation ”a ≤ b” is rewritten in
this standard predicate-based way by ”≤ (a, b)”, while
”the probability that φ is equal to a” is denoted by
the ground atom wN (⋖φ⋗, a) with the binary ”func-
tional” predicate symbol wN (in intensional logic any
n-ary function is represented by the n+1-ary predicate
symbol with first n attributes used as arguments of this
function and last (n+ 1)-th attribute for the resulting
function’s value, analogously as in FOL with identity).
The intensional logic thus is a FOL with terms of FOL
and terms obtained by applying intensional abstrac-
tion to the formulae. We consider a non empty do-
main D = D−1
⋃
DI , where a subdomain D−1 is
made of particulars (extensional entities) and contains
all real numbers, and the rest DI = D0
⋃
D1...
⋃
Dn...
is made of universals (D0 for propositions (the 0-
ary concepts), and Dn, n ≥ 1, for n-ary concepts.
So that, similarly to Boolean algebra for classic
logic, we have the Intensional algebra in Definition 7
Algint = (D, f, t, Id, T ruth, {conjS}S∈P(N2), neg,
{existsn}n∈N), with binary operations conjS :
DI × DI → DI , unary operation neg : DI → DI ,
unary operations existsn : DI → DI . The sets
f = ∅, t = {<>} are the empty set and the set with
empty tuple <>∈ D−1 (i.e., the unique tuple of 0-ary
relation) used for logic falsity and truth as in Codd’s
relational-database algebra [21], while Truth ∈ D0 is
the concept (intension) of the tautology. We define
that D0 = {<>}, so that {f, t} = P(D0).
Any extensionalization function h ∈ E assigns to the
carrier set DI of this algebra (i.e., universals or con-
cepts) an appropriate extension as follows: for each
proposition u ∈ D0, h(u) ∈ {f, t} = P(D0) = P({<>
}) ⊂ P(D−1) is its extension (true or false value),
where P is the powerset operator, and h(Truth) = t;
for each n-ary concept u ∈ Dn, h(u) is a subset of
Dn; in the case of particulars u ∈ D−1, we have that
h(u) = u. We require that operations conj, disj and
neg in this intensional algebra behave in the expected
way with respect to each extensionalization function
(for example, for all u ∈ D0, h(neg(u)) = t iff h(u) = f ,
etc..), that is
h = h−1+
∑
i≥0 hi :
∑
i≥−1Di −→ D−1+
∑
i≥0 P(D
i)
where h−1 = id : D−1 → D−1 is the identity, h0 :
D0 → {f, t} assigns the truth values in {f, t}, to all
propositions, and hi : Di → P(D
i), i ≥ 1, assigns an
extension to all concepts. Thus, the intensions can be
seen as names of abstract or concrete entities, while the
extensions correspond to various rules that these enti-
ties play in different worlds: as shown in Appendix by
Bealer-Montague isomorphism, each extensionalization
function h can be considered equivalently as a ”possible
world” in Montague’s semantics for intensional logic.
The Tarski-style definitions of truth and validity for
this intensional FOL language  L may be given in the
customary way. An intensional interpretation is a
mapping between the set  L of formulae of the logic
language and intensional entities in D, I :  L → D,
is a kind of ”conceptualization”, such that an open-
sentence (virtual predicate) φ(x1, ..., xk) ∈  L with a
tuple of all free variables (x1, ..., xk) is mapped into
a k-ary concept, that is, an intensional entity u =
I(φ(x1, ..., xk)) ∈ Dk, and (closed) sentence ψ into
a proposition (i.e., logic concept) u = I(ψ) ∈ D0
with I(⊤) = Truth ∈ D0 for the FOL tautology ⊤.
A language constant c is mapped into a particular
c = I(c) ∈ D−1 if it is a proper name, otherwise in
a correspondent concept in D. The interpretations of
singular abstracted terms ⋖φ⋗x1...xm will denote an
appropriate proposition (for m = 0), property (for
m = 1), or relation (for m ≥ 2). Thus, the map-
ping of intensional abstracts (terms) into D will be an
extension of I to all abstract, such that the interpre-
tation of ⋖φ⋗ is equal to the meaning of a proposi-
tion φ ∈  L, that is, I(⋖φ⋗) = I(φ) ∈ D0. In
the case when φ is an atom pmi (x1, .., xm) ∈  L then
I(⋖pmi (x1, .., xm)⋗x1,..,xm) = I(p
m
i (x1, .., xm)) ∈ Dm.
The basic intensional logic language  LPR ⊆  L for prob-
abilistic theory is composed by propositions in  L(Φ),
with propositional symbols (0-ary predicate symbols)
p0i = pi ∈ Φ (with I(pi) ∈ D0), with the binary predi-
cate p23 for the weight or probabilistic function wN , the
binary built-in (with constant fixed extension in any
”world’ h ∈ E) predicate p22 for ≤ (the binary predi-
cate = for identity is defined by a = b iff a ≤ b and
b ≤ a), and two built-in ternary predicates p31, p
3
2, de-
noted by ⊕,⊙, for addition and multiplication opera-
tions +, · respectively as required for a logic for reason-
ing about probabilities [7]. The 0-ary functional sym-
bols a, b, c, .. in this logic language will be used as nu-
meric constants for denotation of probabilities in [0, 1],
i.e., with I(a) = a ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ D−1.
Consequently, the ”worlds” (i.e., the extensionalization
functions) will be reduced to the mappings
h = h−1 + h0 + h2 + h3.
We recall that in intensional FOL each n-ary functional
symbol is represented by the (n+1)-ary predicate let-
ter, where the last attribute is introduced for the re-
sulting values of such a function. For example, the first
attribute of the predicate letter wN will contain the in-
tensional abstract of a propositional formula in  L(Φ),
while the second place will contain the probabilistic
value in the interval of reals [0, 1] ⊂ D−1, so that the
ground atom wN (⋖φ⋗, a) in  LPR will have the inter-
pretation I(wN (⋖φ⋗, a)) ∈ D0. The atom wN (x, y),
with variables x and y, will satisfy the functional re-
quirements, that is I(wN (x, y)) ∈ D2 with a binary
relation R = h(I(wN (x, y))) ∈ P(D0× [0, 1]) ⊆ P(D2),
such that for any (u, v) ∈ R there is no v1 6= v
such that (u, v1) ∈ R. Obviously, for this inten-
sional logic we have that h(I(wN (⋖φ⋗, a))) = t iff
(I(⋖φ⋗), I(a)) = (I(φ), a) ∈ R.
Analogously, for the ground atom ⊕(a, b, c), with a =
I(a), b = I(b), c = I(c) ∈ D−1 real numbers, we have
that I(⊕(a, b, c)) ∈ D0 such that for any ”world” h ∈ E
we have that h(I(⊕(a, b, c))) = t iff a + b = c (re-
member that for elements a = I(a) ∈ D−1 we have
that h(I(a)) = a). For addition of more than two el-
ements in this intensional logic we will use intensional
abstract, for example for the sum of three elements
we can use a ground formula ⊕(a, b, d) ∧ ⊕(d, c, e),
such that it holds that h(I(⊕(a, b, d) ∧ ⊕(d, b, c))) =
conj(I(⊕(a, b, d)), I(⊕(d, c, e))) = t iff a + b = d and
d + c = e, that is, iff a + b + c = e. The fixed exten-
sions of the two built-in ternary predicates ⊕(x, y, z)
and ⊙(x, y, z) are equal to:
R⊕ = h(I(⊕(x, y, z))) = {(u1, u2, u1 + u2) | u1, u2 ∈
D−1 are real numbers },
R⊙ = h(I(⊙(x, y, z))) = {(u1, u2, u1·u2) | u1, u2 ∈ D−1
are real numbers }.
The built-in binary predicate ≤ satisfies the follow-
ing requirements for its intensional interpretation: I(≤
(x, y)) ∈ D2 such that for every h ∈ E it holds that
its fixed extension is a binary relation R≤ = h(I(≤
(x, y))) = {(u, v) | u, v ∈ D−1 are real numbers and
u ≤ v}, with the property that h(I(≤ (a1, a2))) = t iff
(I(a1), I(a2)) = (a1, a2) ∈ R≤.
Definition 4 Intensional FOL  LPR is a proba-
bilistic logic with a probability structure M =
(2Φ,P(2Φ), µ, π) if its intentional interpretations sat-
isfy the following property for any propositional for-
mula φ ∈  L(Φ) ⊆  LPR: h(I(wN (⋖φ⋗, a))) = t
iff I(a) =
∑
s∈2Φ & pi(s)(φ)=1 µ({s}).
Let us show that the binary predicate wN is a func-
tional built-in predicate, whose extension is equal in
every possible ”world” h ∈ E , and that the probability
structure can use E as the set of possible worlds in the
place of Nilsson’s set 2Φ. That is, we can replace Nil-
son’s structure with the intensional probability struc-
ture MI = (E ,P(E), µ, π).
Proposition 2 Intensional FOL  LPR is a proba-
bilistic logic with a probability structure M =
(2Φ,P(2Φ), µ, π) if wN is a built-in functional symbol
such that its fixed extension is equal to:
RwN = h(I(wN (x, y))) = {(I(φ), I(a)) | φ ∈  L(Φ) and
I(a) =
∑
h1∈E & h1(I(wN (⋖φ⋗,a)))=t
µ({is−1(h1)})}
where the mapping is : 2Φ → E is a bijection, and is−1
its inverse.
Proof: Let us show that there is a bijection is : 2Φ →
E between the sets 2Φ and E . In fact, let v ∈ 2Φ
be extended (in the unique standard homomorphic
way) to all propositional formulae by v :  L(Φ) → 2.
This propositional valuation corresponds to the inten-
sional interpretation (I, h) obtained, for any sentence
φ ∈  L(Φ), by h(I(φ)) = is2(v(φ)), where is2 : 2 →
{f, t} is a bijection of these two lattices such that
is2(0) = f, is2(1) = t. We have seen that all pred-
icate symbols with arity bigger than 0 of our inten-
sional probabilistic logic  LPR are built-in predicates
(that do not depend on h ∈ E), so that for a fixed in-
tensional interpretation I, any two extensionalization
functions h, h′ differ only on propositions inD0, so that
we obtain the bijective mapping is : v 7→ h, such that
v = is−1
2
◦ h ◦ I, where ◦ denotes the composition of
functions.
From Tarski’s constraint (T) of intensional algebra
(in Appendix) we have that for any ground atom
wN (⋖φ⋗, a) it holds that:
I(wN (⋖φ⋗, a)) = t iff (I(φ), I(a)) ∈ h(I(wN (x, y))).
Thus, form Definition 4, we obtain that (I(φ), I(a)) ∈
h(I(wN (x, y))) iff I(a) =
∑
s∈2Φ & pi(s)(φ)=1 µ({s}).
Consequently,
RwN = h(I(wN (x, y))) = {(I(φ), I(a)) | φ ∈
 L(Φ) and I(a) =
∑
s∈2Φ & pi(s)(φ)=1 µ({s})}, where
I(wN (x, y)) ∈ D2, I(φ) ∈ D0 and I(a) ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ D−1.
But from a bijection is, instead of s ∈ 2Φ we can take
h1 = is(s) ∈ E , and the fact π(s)(φ) = 1 means that
”φ is true in the state s” can be equivalently replaced
by ”φ is true in the ”world” h1 = is(s)”, that is by con-
dition h1(I(wN (⋖φ⋗, a))) = t, so that definition for
the extension of the binary relation RwN for Nilsson’s
probabilities of propositional formulae, given in this
proposition, is correct. This extension is constant in
any ”possible world” in E , thus, the binary functional-
predicate wN is a built-in predicate in this intensional
FOL  LPR.

Consequently, the sentence ”the probability that
φ is equal to a”, expressed by the ground atom
wN (⋖φ⋗, a), is true iff h(I(wN (⋖φ⋗, a))) = t iff
(I(φ), a) ∈ h(I(wn(x, y)) = RwN .
Thus, for the most simple linear inequality, ”the prob-
ability that φ is less then or equal to c”, expressed
by the formula ∃x(wN (⋖φ⋗, x)∧ ≤ (x, c)), is true iff
h(I(∃x(wN (⋖φ⋗, x)∧ ≤ (x, c)))) = t
iff (u, I(c)) ∈ R≤ where u ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ D−1 is deter-
mined by (v, u) ∈ RwN where v = I(φ) ∈ D0.
Analogously to the results obtained for a logic for rea-
soning about probabilities in [7], we obtain the follow-
ing property:
Theorem 1 The intensional FOL  LPR with built-in
binary predicate wN defined in Proposition 2, built-in
binary predicate ≤ and ternary built-in predicates ⊕,⊙,
is sound and complete with respect to the measurable
probability structures.
Proof: We will follow the demonstration analogous
to the demonstration of Theorem 2.2 in [7] for the
sound and complete axiomatization of the axiomatic
system AXMEAS for logic reasoning about probabili-
ties, divided into three parts, which deal respectively
with propositional reasoning, reasoning about linear in-
equalities, and reasoning about probabilities:
1. Propositional reasoning: set of all instances of
propositional tautologies, with unique inference rule
Modus Ponens.
2. Reasoning about linear inequalities: set of all in-
stances of valid formulae about linear inequalities of
the form a1 ·x1+ ...+ak ·xk ≤ c, where a1, ..., ak and c
are integers with k ≥ 1, while x1, ..., xk are probabilis-
tic variables.
3. Reasoning about probability function:
3.1 w(φ) ≥ 0 (nonnegativity)
3.2 w(true) = 1 (the probability of the event true is 1)
3.3 w(φ ∧ ψ) + w(φ ∧ ¬ψ) = w(φ) (additivity)
3.4 w(φ) = w(ψ) if φ ≡ ψ (distributivity).
It is easy to verify that for any propositional axiom
φ, we have that for all ”worlds” h ∈ E it holds that
h(I(φ)) = t, so that it is true in the S5 Kripke model of
the intensional FOL given in Definition 9 (Appendix),
because all algebraic operations in Algint in Definition
7(Appendix) are defined in order to satisfy standard
propositional logic. Moreover, the Modus Ponens rule
is satisfied in every ”world” h ∈ E . Thus, the point 1
above is satisfied by intensional logic  LPR.
The definition of built-in predicates ⊙,⊕ and ≤ satisfy
all linear inequalities, thus the point 2 above.
The definition of binary predicate wN (x, y) is given in
order to satisfy Nilsson’s probability structure, thus all
properties of probability funcion in the point 3 above
are satisfied by wN (x, y) built-in predicate in every
”world” h ∈ E . Consequently, the soundness and com-
pleteness of the intensional logic  LPR with respect to
measurable probability structures, based on the Theo-
rem Theorem 2.2 in [7] is satisfied.

For example, the satisfaction of the linear inequality
a1 ·x1+ a2 · x2 ≤ c, where x1 and x2 are the probabili-
ties of the propositional formulae φ1 and φ2 relatively,
(here the list of quantifications (∃x1)...(∃xk) is abbre-
viated by (∃x1, ..., xk)), expressed by the following in-
tensional formula,
(∃x1, x2, y1, y2, y3)(wN (⋖φ1⋗, x1) ∧ wN (⋖φ2⋗, x2) ∧
⊙(a1, x1, y1) ∧ ⊙(a2, x2, y2) ∧ ⊕(y1, y2, y3)∧ ≤ (y3, c)),
is true iff (I(φ1), u1), (I(φ2), u2) ∈ RwN ,
(I(a1), u1, v1), (I(a2), u2, v2) ∈ R⊙, (v1, v2, v3)) ∈ R⊕
and (v3, I(c)) ∈ R≤,
where u1, u2, v1, .., v3 ∈ D−1 are real numbers.
Analogously, the satisfaction of any linear inequality
a1 · x1 + ...+ ak · xk ≤ c, where xi are the probabilities
of the propositional formulae φi for i = 1, ..., k, k ≥ 2,
can be expressed by the logic formula
(∃x1, ..., xk, y1, ..., yk, z1, ..., zk)(wN (⋖φ1⋗, x1) ∧ ...
∧ wN (⋖φk⋗, xk) ∧ ⊙(a1, x1, y1) ∧ ... ∧ ⊙(ak, xk, yk)
∧ ⊕(0, y1, z1) ∧ ⊕(z1, y2, z2) ∧ ... ∧⊕(zk−1, yk, zk)
∧ ≤ (zk, c)).
Based on the Theorem 2.9 in [7] we can conclude that
the problem of deciding whether such an intensional
formula in  LPR is satisfiable in a measurable probabil-
ity structure of Nilsson is NP-complete.
4 Application to Probabilistic Logic
Programs
The semantics of the interval-based Probabilistic
Logic Programs, based on possible worlds with the
fixpoint semantics for such programs [1], has been
considered valid for more than 13 years. But some
years ago, when I worked with Prof.Subrahmanian
director of the UMIACS institute, I have had the
opportunity to consider the general problems of
(temporal) probabilistic databases [22], to analize
their semantics of interval-based Probabilistic Logic
Programs, and to realize that unfortunately it was not
correctly defined.
Because of that I formally developed, in [23], the
reduction of (temporal) probabilistic databases into
Constraint Logic Programs. Consequently, it was
possible to apply the interval PSAT in order o find the
models of such interval-based probabilistic programs,
as presented and compared with other approaches
in [4]. Moreover, in this complete revision it was
demonstrated that the Temporal-Probabilistic Logic
Programs can be reduced into the particular case of
the ordinary Probabilistic Logic Programs, so that our
application of intensional semantics we can apply only
to this last general case of Logic Programs.
In what follows I will briefly introduce the syntax of
Probabilistic Logic Programs. More about it can be
found in the original work in [1] and in its last revision
in [4]. Let ground(P ) denote the set of all ground
instances of rules of a Probabilistic Logic Program P
with a given domain for object variables, and let H
denote the Herbrand base of this program P . Then,
each ground instance of rules in ground(P ) has the
following syntax:
(∗) A : µ0 ← φ1 : µ1 ∧ ... ∧ φm : µm,
where A ∈ H is a ground atom in a Herebrand base
H , φi, i ≥ 1 are logic formulae composed by ground
atoms and standard logic connectives ∧ and ¬, while
µi = (bi, ci), i ≥ 0, where bi, ci ∈ [0, 1], are the lower
and upper probability boundaries.
The expression φi : µi is a probabilistic-annotated
(p-annotated) basic formula, which is true if the
probability xi of the ground formula φi is between bi
and ci; false otherwise. Thus, this basic p-annotated
formula is the particular case of the 2-valued proba-
bilistic formula:
(∗∗) (1 · xi ≥ ai) ∧ (1 · xi ≤ bi)
composed by two linear inequalities.
Consequently, the standard logic embedding of an-
notated interval-based logic programs can be easily
obtained by the intensional logic  LPR described in
Section 3 where Φ is equal to the Herbrand base H
of the annotated interval-based probabilistic logic
program P .
Thus, based on the translation (∗∗), the logic formula
in intensional logic  LPR correspondent to basic anno-
tated formula φi : µi of the annotated logic program
ground(P ), is equal to the following first-order closed
formulae with a variable xi:
∃xi(wN (⋖φi⋗, xi)∧ ≤ (bi, xi)∧ ≤ (xi, ci)).
Based on this translation, the rule (∗) of the annotated
logic Program ground(P ) can be replaced by the
following rule of an intensional probabilistic logic
program:
∃x0(wN (⋖A⋗, x0)∧ ≤ (b0, x0)∧ ≤ (x0, c0)) ←
← ∃x1(wN (⋖φ1⋗, x1)∧ ≤ (b1, x1)∧ ≤ (x1, c1))∧ ...
∧ ∃xm(wN (⋖φm⋗, xm)∧ ≤ (bm, xm)∧ ≤ (xm, cm)),
with the variables x0, x1, ..., xm.
In this way we obtain a grounded intensional proba-
bilistic logic program PPR, which has both the syntax
and semantics different from the original annotated
probabilistic logic program ground(P ).
As an alternative to this full intensional embedding
of the annotated logic programs into the first-order
intensional logic, we can use a partial embedding by
preserving the old ad hoc annotated syntax of the
probabilistic program ground(P ), by extending the
standard predicate-based syntax of the intensional
FOL logic with annotated formulae, and by defining
only the new intensional interpretation I for these
annotated formulae, as follows: I(φi : µi) =
= I((∃x)(wN (⋖φi⋗, x)) ∧ (≤ (bi, x))∧ ≤ (x, ci)))
= exist(conj{(1,1)}(I(wN (⋖φi⋗, x)), conj{(1,1)}(I(≤
(bi, x)), I(≤ (x, ci))))),
where I(wN (⋖φi⋗, x)), I(≤ (bi, x)), I(≤ (x, ci)) ∈ D1.
So that h(I(φi : µi)) = t iff h(exist(u1)) = t , where
u1 = conj{(1,1)}(I(wN (⋖φi⋗, x)), conj{(1,1)}(I(≤
(bi, x)), I(≤ (x, ci)))) ∈ D1,
iff ∃u(u ∈ h(u1)) iff (I(bi), u), (u, I(ci)) ∈ R≤,
where u ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ D−1 is a particular assignment
for a variable x determined by (v, u) ∈ RwN where
v = I(φi).
Notice that, from Appendix and the fact that u1 ∈ D1,
h(exist(u1)) = f<>(h(I(wN (⋖φi⋗, x)) ⊲⊳{(1,1)}
(h(I(≤ (bi, x))) ⊲⊳{(1,1)} h(I(≤ (x, ci))))
= f<>(h(I(wN (⋖φi⋗, x))
⋂
h(I(≤ (bi, x)))
⋂
h(I(≤
(x, ci))), where f<>(R) = f if R = ∅; t otherwise.
The advantage of this second, partial embedding is
that we can preserve the old syntax for (temporal)
probabilistic logic programs [1, 4], but providing to
them the standard intensional FOL semantics instead
of current ad hoc semantics for such a kind of logic
programs.
5 Conclusion
There are two consequences of this full and natural
embedding of the probability theory in a logic:
1. The full embedding of Nilsson’ probabilistic struc-
ture into propositional logic results in a truth-
functional many-valued logic, differently from
Nilsson’s intuition and current considerations
about propositional probabilistic logic.
2. The logic for reasoning about probabilities can be
embedded into an intensional FOL that remains
to be 2-valued logic, both for propositional formu-
lae in  L(Φ) and predicate formulae for probability
constraints, based on the binary built-in predicate
≤ and binary predicate wN used for the probabil-
ity function, where the basic propositional letters
in Φ are formally considered as nullary predicate
symbols.
The intensional FOL for reasoning about probabilities
is obtained by the particular fusion of the intensional
algebra (analogously to Bealer’s approach) and Mon-
tague’s possible-worlds modal logic for the semantics of
the natural language. In this paper we enriched such
a logic framework by a number of built-in binary and
ternary predicates, which can be used to define the
basic set of probability inequalities and to render the
probability weight function wN an explicit object in
this logic language. We conclude that this intensional
FOL logic with intensional abstraction is a good can-
didate language for specification of Probabilistic Logic
Programs, and we apply two different approaches: first
one is obtained by the translation of the annotated syn-
tax of current logic programs into this intensional FOL;
the second one, instead, modify only the semantics of
these logic programs by preserving their current ad-hoc
annotated syntax.
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6 Appendix: Intensional FOL language
with intensional abstraction
Intensional entities are such concepts as propositions
and properties. What make them ’intensional’ is that
they violate the principle of extensionality; the princi-
ple that extensional equivalence implies identity. All
(or most) of these intensional entities have been classi-
fied at one time or another as kinds of Universals [24].
We consider a non empty domain D = D−1
⋃
DI ,
where a subdomain D−1 is made of particulars (exten-
sional entities), and the rest DI = D0
⋃
D1...
⋃
Dn...
is made of universals (D0 for propositions (the 0-ary
concepts), and Dn, n ≥ 1, for n-ary concepts.
The fundamental entities are intensional abstracts or so
called, ’that’-clauses. We assume that they are singu-
lar terms; Intensional expressions like ’believe’, mean’,
’assert’, ’know’, are standard two-place predicates that
take ’that’-clauses as arguments. Expressions like ’is
necessary’, ’is true’, and ’is possible’ are one-place pred-
icates that take ’that’-clauses as arguments. For exam-
ple, in the intensional sentence ”it is necessary that φ”,
where φ is a proposition, the ’that φ’ is denoted by the
⋖φ⋗, where ⋖⋗ is the intensional abstraction opera-
tor which transforms a logic formula into a term. Or,
for example, ”x believes that φ” is given by formula
p2i (x,⋖φ⋗) ( p
2
i is binary ’believe’ predicate).
Here we will present an intensional FOL with slightly
different intensional abstraction than that originally
presented in [25]:
Definition 5 The syntax of the First-order Logic lan-
guage with intensional abstraction ⋖⋗, denoted by  L,
is as follows:
Logic operators (∧,¬, ∃); Predicate letters in P (func-
tional letters are considered as particular case of predi-
cate letters); Variables x, y, z, .. in V; Abstraction ⋖ ⋗,
and punctuation symbols (comma, parenthesis). With
the following simultaneous inductive definition of term
and formula :
1. All variables and constants (0-ary functional letters
in P) are terms.
2. If t1, ..., tk are terms, then p
k
i (t1, ..., tk) is a formula
(pki ∈ P is a k-ary predicate letter).
3. If φ and ψ are formulae, then (φ ∧ ψ), ¬φ, and
(∃x)φ are formulae.
4. If φ(x) is a formula (virtual predicate) with a list of
free variables in x = (x1, ..., xn) (with ordering from-
left-to-right of their appearance in φ), and α is its sub-
list of distinct variables, then ⋖φ⋗βα is a term, where β
is the remaining list of free variables preserving order-
ing in x as well. The externally quantifiable variables
are the free variables not in α. When n = 0, ⋖φ⋗ is a
term which denotes a proposition, for n ≥ 1 it denotes
a n-ary concept.
An occurrence of a variable xi in a formula (or a term)
is bound ( free) iff it lies (does not lie) within a for-
mula of the form (∃xi)φ (or a term of the form ⋖φ⋗βα
with xi ∈ α). A variable is free (bound) in a formula
(or term) iff it has (does not have) a free occurrence in
that formula (or term).
A sentence is a formula having no free variables. The
binary predicate letter p21 for identity is singled out as a
distinguished logical predicate and formulae of the form
p21(t1, t2) are to be rewritten in the form t1
.
= t2. We
denote by R= the binary relation obtained by standard
Tarski’s interpretation of this predicate p21. The logic
operators ∀,∨,⇒ are defined in terms of (∧,¬, ∃) in
the usual way.
The intensional interpretation of this intensional FOL
is a mapping between the set  L of formulae of the logic
language and intensional entities in D, I :  L → D,
is a kind of ”conceptualization”, such that an open-
sentence (virtual predicate) φ(x1, ..., xk) with a tu-
ple of all free variables (x1, ..., xk) is mapped into
a k-ary concept, that is, an intensional entity u =
I(φ(x1, ..., xk)) ∈ Dk, and (closed) sentence ψ into
a proposition (i.e., logic concept) v = I(ψ) ∈ D0
with I(⊤) = Truth ∈ D0 for the FOL tautology ⊤.
A language constant c is mapped into a particular
a = I(c) ∈ D−1 if it is a proper name, otherwise in
a correspondent concept in D.
An assignment g : V → D for variables in V is applied
only to free variables in terms and formulae. Such an
assignment g ∈ DV can be recursively uniquely ex-
tended into the assignment g∗ : T → D, where T
denotes the set of all terms (here I is an intensional
interpretation of this FOL, as explained in what fol-
lows), by :
1. g∗(t) = g(x) ∈ D if the term t is a variable x ∈ V .
2. g∗(t) = I(c) ∈ D if the term t is a constant c ∈ P .
3. if t is an abstracted term ⋖φ⋗βα, then g
∗(⋖φ⋗βα) =
I(φ[β/g(β)]) ∈ Dk, k = |α| (i.e., the number
of variables in α), where g(β) = g(y1, .., ym) =
(g(y1), ..., g(ym)) and [β/g(β)] is a uniform replacement
of each i-th variable in the list β with the i-th constant
in the list g(β). Notice that α is the list of all free
variables in the formula φ[β/g(β)].
We denote by t/g (or φ/g) the ground term (or for-
mula) without free variables, obtained by assignment
g from a term t (or a formula φ), and by φ[x/t] the
formula obtained by uniformly replacing x by a term t
in φ.
The distinction between intensions and extensions is
important especially because we are now able to have
and equational theory over intensional entities (as
⋖φ⋗), that is predicate and function ”names”, that
is separate from the extensional equality of relations
and functions. An extensionalization function h as-
signs to the intensional elements of D an appropri-
ate extension as follows: for each proposition u ∈ D0,
h(u) ∈ {f, t} ⊆ P(D−1) is its extension (true or false
value); for each n-ary concept u ∈ Dn, h(u) is a sub-
set of Dn (n-th Cartesian product of D); in the case of
particulars u ∈ D−1, h(u) = u.
The sets f, t are empty set {} and set {<>} (with the
empty tuple <>∈ D−1 i.e. the unique tuple of 0-ary
relation) which may be thought of as falsity and truth,
as those used in the Codd’s relational-database alge-
bra [21] respectively, while Truth ∈ D0 is the concept
(intension) of the tautology.
We define that D0 = {<>}, so that {f, t} = P(D0).
Thus we have:
h = h−1+
∑
i≥0 hi :
∑
i≥−1Di −→ D−1+
∑
i≥0 P(D
i),
where h−1 = id : D−1 → D−1 is identity, h0 : D0 →
{f, t} assigns truth values in {f, t}, to all propositions,
and hi : Di → P(Di), i ≥ 1, assigns extension to all
concepts, where P is the powerset operator. Thus, in-
tensions can be seen as names of abstract or concrete
entities, while extensions correspond to various rules
that these entities play in different worlds.
Remark: (Tarski’s constraint) This semantics has to
preserve Tarski’s semantics of the FOL, that is, for
any formula φ ∈  L with the tuple of free variables
(x1, ..., xk), any assignment g ∈ DV , and every h ∈ E
it has to be satisfied that:
(T) h(I(φ/g)) = t iff (g(x1), ..., g(xk)) ∈ h(I(φ)).

Thus, intensional FOL has the simple Tarski first-order
semantics, with a decidable unification problem, but
we need also the actual world mapping which maps
any intensional entity to its actual world extension. In
what follows we will identify a possible world by a par-
ticular mapping which assigns to intensional entities
their extensions in such possible world. That is direct
bridge between intensional FOL and possible worlds
representation [26, 27, 28, 29, 30], where intension of
a proposition is a function from possible worlds W˜ to
truth-values, and properties and functions from W˜ to
sets of possible (usually not-actual) objects.
Here E denotes the set of possible extensionalization
functions that satisfy the constraint (T); they can
be considered as possible worlds (as in Montague’s
intensional semantics for natural language [28, 30]),
as demonstrated in [31, 12], given by the bijection
is :W ≃ E .
Now we are able to define formally this intensional se-
mantics:
Definition 6 Two-step Intensional Semantics:
Let R =
⋃
k∈N P(D
k) =
∑
k∈N P(D
k) be the set of
all k-ary relations, where k ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, ...}. Notice
that {f, t} = P(D0) ∈ R, that is, the truth values are
extensions in R.
The intensional semantics of the logic language with
the set of formulae  L can be represented by the map-
ping
 L −→I D =⇒w∈W R,
where −→I is a fixed intensional interpretation
I :  L → D and =⇒w∈W is the set of all exten-
sionalization functions h = is(w) : D → R in E, where
is : W → E is the mapping from the set of possible
worlds to the set of extensionalization functions.
We define the mapping In :  Lop → RW , where
 Lop is the subset of formulae with free variables (vir-
tual predicates), such that for any virtual predicate
φ(x1, ..., xk) ∈  Lop the mapping In(φ(x1, ..., xk)) :
W → R is the Montague’s meaning (i.e., intension)
of this virtual predicate [26, 27, 28, 29, 30], that is,
the mapping which returns with the extension of this
(virtual) predicate in every possible world in W.
We adopted this two-step intensional semantics, in-
stead of well known Montague’s semantics (which lies
in the construction of a compositional and recursive
semantics that covers both intension and extension)
because of a number of its weakness.
Example 1: Let us consider the following two past
participles: ’bought’ and ’sold’(with unary predicates
p11(x), ’x has been bought’, and p
1
2(x),’x has been
sold’). These two different concepts in the Montague’s
semantics would have not only the same extension but
also their intension, from the fact that their extensions
are identical in every possible world. Within the two-
steps formalism we can avoid this problem by assign-
ing two different concepts (meanings) u = I(p11(x)) and
v = I(p12(x)) in ∈ D1. Notice that the same problem
we have in the Montague’s semantics for two sentences
with different meanings, which bear the same truth
value across all possible worlds: in the Montague’s se-
mantics they will be forced to the same meaning.

Another relevant question w.r.t. this two-step inter-
pretations of an intensional semantics is how in it is
managed the extensional identity relation
.
= (binary
predicate of the identity) of the FOL. Here this ex-
tensional identity relation is mapped into the binary
concept Id = I(
.
= (x, y)) ∈ D2, such that (∀w ∈
W)(is(w)(Id) = R=), where
.
= (x, y) (i.e., p21(x, y))
denotes an atom of the FOL of the binary predicate
for identity in FOL, usually written by FOL formula
x
.
= y (here we prefer to distinguish this formal symbol
.
= ∈ P of the built-in identity binary predicate letter
in the FOL from the standard mathematical symbol
’=’ used in all mathematical definitions in this paper).
In what follows we will use the function f<> : R→ R,
such that for any R ∈ R, f<>(R) = {<>} if R 6= ∅; ∅
otherwise. Let us define the following set of algebraic
operators for relations in R:
1. binary operator ⊲⊳S: R ×R → R, such that for
any two relations R1, R2 ∈ R , the R1 ⊲⊳S R2
is equal to the relation obtained by natural join
of these two relations if S is a non empty set
of pairs of joined columns of respective relations
(where the first argument is the column index of
the relation R1 while the second argument is the
column index of the joined column of the rela-
tion R2); otherwise it is equal to the cartesian
product R1 × R2. For example, the logic for-
mula φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) ∧ ψ(xl, yi, xj , yj) will be
traduced by the algebraic expression R1 ⊲⊳S R2
where R1 ∈ P(D5), R2 ∈ P(D4) are the extensions
for a given Tarski’s interpretation of the virtual
predicate φ, ψ relatively, so that S = {(4, 1), (2, 3)}
and the resulting relation will have the following
ordering of attributes: (xi, xj , xk, xl, xm, yi, yj).
2. unary operator ∼: R → R, such that for any
k-ary (with k ≥ 0) relation R ∈ P(Dk) ⊂ R we
have that ∼ (R) = Dk\R ∈ Dk, where ’\’ is the
substraction of relations. For example, the logic
formula ¬φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) will be traduced by
the algebraic expression D5\R where R is the ex-
tensions for a given Tarski’s interpretation of the
virtual predicate φ.
3. unary operator π−m : R → R, such that for any
k-ary (with k ≥ 0) relation R ∈ P(Dk) ⊂ R we
have that π−m(R) is equal to the relation obtained
by elimination of the m-th column of the relation
R if 1 ≤ m ≤ k and k ≥ 2; equal to f<>(R) if
m = k = 1; otherwise it is equal to R. For exam-
ple, the logic formula (∃xk)φ(xi, xj , xk, xl, xm) will
be traduced by the algebraic expression π−3(R)
where R is the extensions for a given Tarski’s in-
terpretation of the virtual predicate φ and the re-
sulting relation will have the following ordering of
attributes: (xi, xj , xl, xm).
Notice that the ordering of attributes of resulting re-
lations corresponds to the method used for generating
the ordering of variables in the tuples of free variables
adopted for virtual predicates.
Analogously to Boolean algebras which are extensional
models of propositional logic, we introduce an inten-
sional algebra for this intensional FOL as follows.
Definition 7 Intensional algebra for the in-
tensional FOL in Definition 5 is a structure
Algint = (D, f, t, Id, T ruth, {conjS}S∈P(N2), neg,
{existsn}n∈N), with binary operations conjS :
DI × DI → DI , unary operation neg : DI → DI ,
unary operations existsn : DI → DI, such that
for any extensionalization function h ∈ E, and
u ∈ Dk, v ∈ Dj, k, j ≥ 0,
1. h(Id) = R= and h(Truth) = {<>}.
2. h(conjS(u, v)) = h(u) ⊲⊳S h(v), where ⊲⊳S
is the natural join operation defined above and
conjS(u, v) ∈ Dm where m = k + j − |S| if for every
pair (i1, i2) ∈ S it holds that 1 ≤ i1 ≤ k, 1 ≤ i2 ≤ j
(otherwise conjS(u, v) ∈ Dk+j).
3. h(neg(u)) = ∼ (h(u)) = Dk\(h(u)), where ∼
is the operation defined above and neg(u) ∈ Dk.
4. h(existsn(u)) = π−n(h(u)), where π−n is the
operation defined above and existsn(u) ∈ Dk−1 if
1 ≤ n ≤ k (otherwise existsn is the identity function).
Notice that for u ∈ D0, h(neg(u)) = ∼ (h(u)) =
D0\(h(u)) = {<>}\(h(u)) ∈ {f, t}.
We define a derived operation union : (P(Di)\∅) →
Di, i ≥ 0, such that, for any B = {u1, ..., un} ∈ P(Di)
we have that union({u1, ..., un}) =def u1 if n = 1;
neg(conjS(neg(u1), conjS(..., neg(un))...), where
S = {(l, l) | 1 ≤ l ≤ i}, otherwise.
Than we obtain that for n ≥ 2:
h(union(B) = h(neg(conjS(neg(u1), conjS(..., neg(un))...)
= Di\((Di\h(u1) ⊲⊳S ... ⊲⊳S (Di\h(un))
= Di\((Di\h(u1)
⋂
...
⋂
(Di\h(un))
=
⋃
{h(uj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} =
⋃
{h(u) | u ∈ B}.
Once one has found a method for specifying the
interpretations of singular terms of  L (take in con-
sideration the particularity of abstracted terms), the
Tarski-style definitions of truth and validity for  L
may be given in the customary way. What is being
south specifically is a method for characterizing the
intensional interpretations of singular terms of  L in
such a way that a given singular abstracted term
⋖φ⋗βα will denote an appropriate property, relation,
or proposition, depending on the value of m = |α|.
Thus, the mapping of intensional abstracts (terms)
into D we will define differently from that given in the
version of Bealer [32], as follows:
Definition 8 An intensional interpretation I can be
extended to abstracted terms as follows: for any ab-
stracted term ⋖φ⋗βα we define that,
I(⋖φ⋗βα) = union({I(φ[β/g(β)]) | g ∈ D
β}),
where β denotes the set of elements in the list β, and
the assignments in Dβ are limited only to the variables
in β.
Remark: Here we can make the question if there is a
sense to extend the interpretation also to (abstracted)
terms, because in Tarski’s interpretation of FOL we
do not have any interpretation for terms, but only the
assignments for terms, as we defined previously by the
mapping g∗ : T → D. The answer is positive, because
the abstraction symbol ⋖ ⋗βα can be considered as
a kind of the unary built-in functional symbol of
intensional FOL, so that we can apply the Tarskian
interpretation to this functional symbol into the fixed
mapping I(⋖ ⋗βα) :  L → D, so that for any φ ∈  L we
have that I(⋖φ⋗βα) is equal to the application of this
function to the value φ, that is, to I(⋖ ⋗βα)(φ). In
such an approach we would introduce also the typed
variable X for the formulae in  L, so that the Tarskian
assignment for this functional symbol with variable X ,
with g(X) = φ ∈  L, can be given by:
g∗(⋖ ⋗βα (X)) = I(⋖ ⋗
β
α)(g(X)) = I(⋖ ⋗
β
α)(φ)
= <>∈ D−1, if α
⋃
β is not equal to the set of free
variables in φ;
= union({I(φ[β/g′(β)]) | g′ ∈ Dβ}) ∈ D|α|, otherwise.

Notice than if β = ∅ is the empty list, then
I(⋖φ⋗βα) = I(φ). Consequently, the denotation
of ⋖φ⋗ is equal to the meaning of a proposi-
tion φ, that is, I(⋖φ⋗) = I(φ) ∈ D0. In
the case when φ is an atom pmi (x1, .., xm) then
I(⋖pmi (x1, .., xm)⋗x1,..,xm) = I(p
m
i (x1, .., xm)) ∈
Dm, while I(⋖p
m
i (x1, .., xm)⋗
x1,..,xm) =
union({I(pmi (g(x1), .., g(xm))) | g ∈ D
{x1,..,xm}}) ∈
D0, with h(I(⋖p
m
i (x1, .., xm)⋗
x1,..,xm)) =
h(I((∃x1)...(∃xm)pmi (x1, .., xm))) ∈ {f, t}.
For example, h(I(⋖p1i (x1) ∧ ¬p
1
i (x1)⋗
x1)) =
h(I((∃x1)(⋖p1i (x1) ∧ ¬p
1
i (x1)⋗
x1))) = f .
The interpretation of a more complex abstract ⋖φ⋗βα
is defined in terms of the interpretations of the
relevant syntactically simpler expressions, because the
interpretation of more complex formulae is defined
in terms of the interpretation of the relevant syn-
tactically simpler formulae, based on the intensional
algebra above. For example, I(p1i (x) ∧ p
1
k(x)) =
conj{(1,1)}(I(p
1
i (x)), I(p
1
k(x))), I(¬φ) = neg(I(φ)),
I(∃xi)φ(xi, xj , xi, xk) = exists3(I(φ)).
Consequently, based on the intensional algebra in
Definition 7 and on intensional interpretations of
abstracted term in Definition 8, it holds that the
interpretation of any formula in  L (and any abstracted
term) will be reduced to an algebraic expression
over interpretation of primitive atoms in  L. This
obtained expression is finite for any finite formula (or
abstracted term), and represents the meaning of such
finite formula (or abstracted term).
The extension of abstracted terms satisfy the following
property:
Proposition 3 For any abstracted term ⋖φ⋗βα with
|α| ≥ 1 we have that h(I(⋖φ⋗βα)) = π−β(h(I(φ))),
where π−(y1,...,yk) = π−y1 ◦ ... ◦π−y1, ◦ is the sequential
composition of functions), and π−∅ is an identity.
Proof: Let x be a tuple of all free variables in φ, so
that x = α
⋃
β, α = (x1, ..., xk), then we have that
h(I(⋖φ⋗βα)) =
= h(union({I(φ[β/g(β)]) | g ∈ Dβ})), from Def. 8
=
⋃
{h(I(φ[β/g(β)])) | g ∈ Dβ}
=
⋃
{{(g1(x1), ..., g1(xk)) | g1 ∈ Dα and
h(I(φ[β/g(β)][α/g1(α)])) = t} | g ∈ Dβ}
= {g1(α) | g1 ∈ Dα
⋃
β and h(I(φ/g1)) = t}
= π−β({g1(x) | g1 ∈ Dx and h(I(φ/g1)) = t})
= π−β({g1(x) | g1 ∈ Dx and g1(x) ∈ h(I(φ))}), by (T)
= π−β(h(I(φ))).

We can connect E with a possible-world semantics.
Such a correspondence is a natural identification of
intensional logics with modal Kripke based logics.
Definition 9 (Model): A model for intensional FOL
with fixed intensional interpretation I, which express
the two-step intensional semantics in Definition 6,
is the Kripke structure Mint = (W ,D, V ), where
W = {is−1(h) | h ∈ E}, a mapping V : W ×
P →
⋃
n<ω{t, f}
Dn, with P a set of predicate sym-
bols of the language, such that for any world w =
is−1(h) ∈ W , pni ∈ P , and (u1, ..., un) ∈ D
n it holds
that V (w, pni )(u1, ..., un) = h(I(p
n
i (u1, ..., un))). The
satisfaction relation |=w,g for a given w ∈ W and as-
signment g ∈ DV is defined as follows:
1. M |=w,g pki (x1, ..., xk) iff V (w, p
k
i )(g(x1), ...
, g(xk)) = t,
2. M |=w,g ϕ ∧ φ iff M |=w,g ϕ and M |=w,g φ,
3. M |=w,g ¬ϕ iff not M |=w,g ϕ,
4. M |=w,g (∃x)φ iff
4.1. M |=w,g φ, if x is not a free variable in φ;
4.2. exists u ∈ D such that M |=w,g φ[x/u], if x is a
free variable in φ.
It is easy to show that the satisfaction relation |= for
this Kripke semantics in a world w = is−1(h) is defined
by, M |=w,g φ iff h(I(φ/g)) = t.
We can enrich this intensional FOL by another modal
operators, as for example the ”necessity” universal op-
erator with an accessibility relation R =W×W , ob-
taining the S5 Kripke structure Mint = (W ,R,D, V ),
in order to be able to define the following equivalences
between the abstracted terms without free variables
⋖φ⋗β1α /g and ⋖ψ⋗
β2
α /g, where all free variables (not
in α) are instantiated by g ∈ DV (here A ≡ B denotes
the formula (A⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A)):
• (Strong) intensional equivalence (or equality) ”≍”
is defined by:
⋖φ⋗β1α /g ≍ ⋖ψ⋗
β2
α /g iff (φ[β1/g(β1)] ≡
ψ[β2/g(β2)]),
with M |=w,g′ ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W ,
(w,w′) ∈ R implies M |=w′,g′ ϕ.
From Example 1 we have that ⋖p11(x) ⋗x ≍ ⋖
p12(x)⋗x, that is ’x has been bought’ and ’x
has been sold’ are intensionally equivalent, but
they have not the same meaning (the concept
I(p11(x)) ∈ D1 is different from I(p
1
2(x)) ∈ D1).
• Weak intensional equivalence ”≈” is defined by:
⋖φ⋗β1α /g ≈ ⋖ψ⋗
β2
α /g iff ♦φ[β1/g(β1)] ≡
♦ψ[β2/g(β2)].
The symbol ♦ = ¬¬ is the correspondent exis-
tential modal operator.
This weak equivalence is used for P2P database
integration in a number of papers [33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 31].
Notice that we do not use the intensional equality in
our language, thus we do not need the correspondent
operator in intensional algebra Algint for the logic
”necessity” modal operator .
This semantics is equivalent to the algebraic semantics
for  L in [25] for the case of the conception where
intensional entities are considered to be equal if and
only if they are necessarily equivalent. Intensional
equality is much stronger that the standard exten-
sional equality in the actual world, just because
requires the extensional equality in all possible
worlds, in fact, if ⋖φ ⋗β1α /g ≍ ⋖ψ ⋗
β1
α /g then
h(I(⋖A ⋗β1α /g)) = h(I(⋖ψ ⋗
β2
α /g)) for all exten-
sionalization functions h ∈ E (that is possible worlds
is−1(h) ∈ W˜).
It is easy to verify that the intensional equality means
that in every possible world w ∈ W˜ the intensional
entities u1 and u2 have the same extensions.
Let the logic modal formula φ[β1/g(β1)], where
the assignment g is applied only to free variables
in β1 of a formula φ not in the list of variables in
α = (x1, ..., xn), n ≥ 1, represents a n-ary inten-
sional concept such that I(φ[β1/g(β1)]) ∈ Dn and
I(φ[β1/g(β1)]) = I(⋖φ ⋗
β1
α /g) ∈ Dn. Then the
extension of this n-ary concept is equal to (here
the mapping necess : Di → Di for each i ≥ 0 is a
new operation of the intensional algebra Algint in
Definition 7):
h(I(φ[β1/g(β1)]) = h(necess(I(φ[β1/g(β1)]))) =
= {(g′(x1), ..., g′(xn)) | M |=w,g′ φ[β1/g(β1)] and
g′ ∈ DV}
= {(g′(x1), ..., g′(xn)) | g′ ∈ DV and ∀w1((w,w1) ∈ R
implies M |=w1,g′ φ[β1/g(β1)]) }
=
⋂
h1∈ E
h1(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])).
While,
h(I(♦φ[β1/g(β1)]) = h(I(¬¬φ[β1/g(β1)])
= h(neg(necess(I(¬φ[β1/g(β1)]))))
= Dn\h(necess(I(¬φ[β1/g(β1)])))
= Dn\(
⋂
h1∈ E
h1(I(¬φ[β1/g(β1)])))
= Dn\(
⋂
h1∈ E
h1(neg(I(φ[β1/g(β1)]))))
= Dn\(
⋂
h1∈ E
Dn\h1(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])))
=
⋃
h1∈ E
h1(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])).
Consequently, the concepts φ[β1/g(β1)] and
♦φ[β1/g(β1)] are the built-in (or rigid) concept
as well, whose extensions does not depend on possible
worlds.
Thus, two concepts are intensionally equal, that is,
⋖φ⋗β1α /g ≍ ⋖ ψ ⋗
β2
α /g, iff h(I(φ[β1/g(β1)])) =
h(I(ψ[β2/g(β2)])) for every h. Moreover, two concepts
are weakly equivalent, that is, ⋖φ⋗β1α /g ≈ ⋖ψ⋗
β2
α /g,
iff h(I(♦φ[β1/g(β1)])) = h(I(♦ψ[β2/g(β2)])).
